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Identification card for an ex-political detainee held at Buru
Island forced detention camp. The identification number at the
top of card bears the discriminatory “ET” code (see sections
III(A) & (F) of report). 
Postcard sent from a political detainee from Buru Island forced
detention in 1974. The stamp demonstrates that the contents of
the postcard had been censored.
Forced labor camp in a paddy field, 1979 (see section III(D)).
All images courtesy of People’s Empowerment Consortium (PEC), Jakarta, Indonesia. 
Badge given to political detainees held on Buru Island, with dis-
tinctive stamp stigmatizing the person as from Buru, the most
notorious detention camp (see sections III(B), (E), VI(A)).
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About the ICTJ
The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) assists countries pursuing accountability
for past mass atrocity or human rights abuse. The Center works in societies emerging from
repressive rule or armed conflict, as well as in established democracies where historical injustices
or systemic abuses remain unresolved.
In order to promote justice, peace, and reconciliation, government officials and nongovernmental
advocates are likely to consider a variety of transitional justice approaches including both judicial
and nonjudicial responses to human rights crimes. The ICTJ assists in the development of 
integrated, comprehensive, and localized approaches to transitional justice comprising five key
elements: prosecuting perpetrators, documenting and acknowledging violations through nonjudicial
means such as truth commissions, reforming abusive institutions, providing reparations to victims,
and facilitating reconciliation processes.
The Center is committed to building local capacity and generally strengthening the emerging field
of transitional justice, and works closely with organizations and experts around the world to do so.
By working in the field through local languages, the ICTJ provides comparative information, legal
and policy analysis, documentation, and strategic research to justice and truth-seeking institutions,
nongovernmental organizations, governments and others.
Background on Indonesia
Indonesia continues to grapple with a legacy of abuse and authoritarianism characterized by state-
organized violence and conflict over natural resources and self-determination. Some of the central
transitional justice issues in Indonesia involve serious crimes committed during the occupation of 
East Timor. The clarification of violations committed under the Soeharto regime is also important,
in particular the massive persecution of dissidents in the early days of the "New Order." In
addition, the conduct of regional conflicts confronting the state and separatist insurgencies, as in
the cases of Aceh and Papua, is a central issue.
After 33 years of widespread human rights abuses committed by the armed forces and other groups
under the "New Order" regime led by General Soeharto, in 1998 Indonesia began a political
transition. Amid a deepening financial, economic, and social crisis, Soeharto stepped down in May
1998 in favor of his vice president, B.J. Habibie. Abdurrahman Wahid, a moderate Islamic cleric 
and long-time opposition leader, who won the 1999 presidential election, succeeded Habibie as
president. Both Habibie and Wahid made some progress in the areas of democratization and human
rights, including taking the decision to give East Timor the choice to decide on its status,
sponsoring broad constitutional reforms, and setting up a Human Rights Court. Despite these 
advances, officially addressing Indonesia's legacy of abuse continues to be a daunting task.
In July 2001, Megawati Sukarnoputri, who had served as Wahid's vice president, assumed the 
presidency after the legislature removed Wahid from power. Under her watch, the Human Rights
Court prosecuted persons allegedly responsible for crimes in East Timor, but these trials have
resulted in the acquittal of a majority of the accused and have been severely criticized as biased and
ineffective. Further, she did not take effective steps to restore the honor and status of victims of 
persecution during the Soeharto regime.
iii
The successive government of President S.B. Yudhoyono has seen the successful conclusion of a 
peace agreement in Aceh to end a 30-year old conflict in that region of Northern Sumatra.
However, the accountability provisions included in the agreement between the government and the
former insurgency of the Free Aceh Movement are still ambiguous. President Yudhoyono has not
yet acted on the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission for which legislation has
existed since 2004. The Constitutional Court of Indonesia is examining that legislation due to
demands that it contradicts constitutional rights and international human rights standards applicable 
to Indonesia.
The ICTJ’s Work in Indonesia
In August 2003, the ICTJ released "Intended to Fail," an analysis of the trials before the Ad Hoc
Human Rights Court in Jakarta. The report suggests that Indonesia never intended to fulfill its
promise of holding perpetrators accountable for the violence surrounding the East Timorese vote 
for independence in 1999.
ICTJ Senior Associate and head of the Center's Indonesia program, Eduardo Gonzalez, worked
with Timorese, Indonesian, and international NGOs to request that the United Nations develop an
appropriate response to this failure. The ICTJ favored the creation of an independent Commission
of Experts (COE) to advise the UN on how to proceed in the face of impunity. After the work of
the COE was finished, the ICTJ advocated at the UN for the implementation of its
recommendations, which were finally endorsed by the Secretary General in July 2006.
The Center also monitored parliamentary efforts to establish a Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC) and coordinated with local partners to try to ensure that the proposed body
would respect victims' rights and promote accountability. In December 2004, the ICTJ released a 
comprehensive study of the truth commission legislation, and in February 2005, together with local
partners, co-sponsored a conference in Jakarta for civil society leaders and activists to develop a 
strategy for achieving accountability and justice in the face of deep flaws in the legislation
establishing a TRC. In September 2005, the Center participated in a seminar organized by ELSAM,
the Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy, to explore ways to remedy the weaknesses of the 
TRC mandate and helped human rights organizations who challenged the legislation before the
Constitutional Court of Indonesia. The ICTJ submitted expert testimony before the Court in July
and August of 2006.
Any effective intervention in the field of transitional justice requires a comprehensive analysis of 
the capacity of local civil society and the recommendation of specific methods to strengthen that
capacity. In January 2004, the ICTJ released "The Struggle for Truth and Justice," a report that
maps nearly 200 transitional justice initiatives undertaken by Indonesian civil society
organizations. The report revealed a robust level of activity, and the interest shown in transitional
justice led to the hiring of Jakarta-based consultants to help monitor local efforts. The Center has
published a monthly newsletter in Bahasa Indonesia to disseminate transitional justice information
throughout the region. The ICTJ also held a workshop for university professors to help incorporate 
transitional justice issues into their curricula and expects to continue cooperation in this respect,
since it is essential that Indonesian practitioners develop their own understanding and
conceptualization of the transitional justice framework.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Indonesia is eight years into its transition to democracy after over three decades of gross human
rights violations under General Soeharto. Those human rights violations had their symbolic and
practical genesis in the events of September 30, 1965, an alleged Communist putsch the successful
repression of which led to the emergence of an authoritarian right-wing regime led by General
Soeharto.
General Soeharto, leader of the Indonesian Army, mounted a comprehensive campaign accusing
members of the Indonesia Communist Party (PKI) of mounting an unsuccessful coup on September
30, 1965 against President Soekarno. Eventually, Soeharto’s ascent to power displaced President
Soekarno himself, who was removed from power on March 21, 1967. Soeharto’s persecution,
discrimination, and stigmatization of the PKI and anyone arbitrarily deemed connected to it,
enabled him to wrest and maintain political power in Indonesia.
The “1965 victims,” as they are known in Indonesia, are all those people who disappeared, were
killed, detained, or discriminated against allegedly on the basis of their involvement in the 
September 30, 1965 events or their affiliation with the PKI. Those events were frequently used by
Soeharto to persecute anyone opposed to him, and to generally maintain an authoritarian state. The
vast majority of gross violations of human rights committed against the 1965 victims were
perpetrated between October 1965 and March 1966 when hundreds of thousands of Indonesians
were killed and as many as 1.7 million people were detained without trial. Those 1965 victims who
survived received no official restitution. On the contrary, they were stigmatized in their 
communities and forced to organize their lives according to myriad of regulations that prohibited
them from engaging in a vast array of normal civic activities. For decades, the 1965 victims were
prohibited from voting or working in such professions as education or the law.
Under international law, victims of gross human rights violations, such as the 1965 victims, have
the right to reparation. The corresponding State duty to provide reparations includes restitution of
the victims’ enjoyment of rights, family life, and citizenship, place of residence, employment, and
property.
2
It also includes a duty to apologize, provide compensation, and revoke mechanisms
which continue to violate human rights. These duties are not affected by the fact that the violations
were committed under a previous government. Reparations are of vital importance because they
provide victims with official recognition, thus signifying that all citizens are considered equal
before the law. Reparations promote justice by redressing violations of human rights and aim to
restore the trust of citizens in State institutions. Moreover, reparations are broader than merely
returning stolen property or restoring a victim’s “political reputation.”
1
This report was written by Teresa Birks, ICTJ consultant from Nov. 2003 to Apr. 2005 and currently at the
School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. It was edited by Andrew Hudson, ICTJ
Fellow in 2006, and contributed to by Taufik Basari and Leonardo Filippini, ICTJ fellows in 2005. The
report was supervised by Eduardo Gonzalez, senior associate at the ICTJ.
2
See Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law,
G.A. Res. 60/147, U.N. Doc. A/Res/60/147 (Dec. 16, 2005).
2Ironically, while there are currently calls to forgive or pardon an ill Soeharto,
3
who was ousted in
1998 amidst allegations of corruption and economic mismanagement, the 1965 victims remain
stigmatized and discriminated against. Explicitly discriminatory legislation and practices remain in
force. The transition to democracy in Indonesia has at least allowed victims’ organizations to form
and they have recently spearheaded the campaign to provide rehabilitasi to the 1965 victims.
Rehabilitasi is an Indonesian concept akin to political restitution, which centers on restoring the 
good name and reputation of the individual.
This report first outlines Indonesia’s international law obligations to provide remedies to the 1965
victims. Second, it traces the history of persecution against the 1965 victims and provides an
overview of current discriminatory laws and practices. Third, it summarizes efforts by victims’ 
groups to fight the effects of discriminatory practices. Fourth, it demonstrates that successive
Indonesian administrations have failed to adequately address the problem. This report builds on
domestic calls for rehabilitasi. However, it also demonstrates how the current Indonesian
government should implement a comprehensive reparations framework broader than just
rehabilitasi. Such a reparations program should be located within a coherent strategy of transitional
justice including genuine truth-seeking, prosecution, and comprehensive institutional reform.
In this report, the victims of persecution (be it death, detention, loss of job or property) will be
referred to as the “1965 victims.” The activities which caused the persecution will be referred to as
the “1965 events.” Those 1965 victims who were detained will be referred to as “political
detainees” or “ex-political detainees.”
4
The category of 1965 victims is therefore very broad.
Soeharto used the term with considerable elasticity to discriminate against a wide range of people.
As such, in providing remedies to the 1965 victims, the definition of that group should be
commensurately broad.
Finally, this report focuses on the 1965 victims as a case study of one set of victims under the 
Soeharto regime. Yet, there were numerous other groups of victims whose rights were violated by
Soeharto and who were unrelated to the 1965 victims. The reason this report focuses on just the
1965 victims is that they are unique being the first victims under Soeharto. They are seen
symbolically as the “seminal” or “foundation” victims under the Soeharto era. It was on the basis
of the persecution of the 1965 victims that Soeharto obtained and consolidated power, thereby
enabling further discrimination. Nevertheless, the vast majority of this report’s analysis and
recommendations in relation to the 1965 victims are equally applicable to all victims of 
discrimination and gross violations of human rights under Soeharto. In devising transitional justice
mechanisms for the 1965 victims, victims of other human rights abuses must also receive similar
treatment.
3
See, e.g., ‘Let Us Invent Human Rights’, Jakarta Post, June 27, 2006 (“the general sentiment among
politicians is to ‘forgive Soeharto’”); ‘Law Enforcement not Yet a Priority in Indonesia', Jakarta Post, June
22, 2006.
4
For a further explanation of these and other terms, see the glossary in chapter 7 of this report.
3II. INTERNATIONAL AND INDONESIAN LAW ON REPARATIONS
A. General
States must provide victims of gross violations of human rights with an effective remedy. A
victim’s right to an effective remedy includes access to justice, reparation for harm suffered, and
access to the relevant information concerning the violation.
5
Restitution, the focus of this report, is
one element of the victim’s right to reparation. The broader right to an effective remedy is
enshrined in international
6
and regional
7
human rights instruments, as well as international
humanitarian law
8
and international criminal law.
9
Within this context, Indonesia has international
legal obligations to provide victims of gross human rights violations with effective remedies
including comprehensive reparations.
B. Indonesian Human Rights Laws
Indonesian law, in addition to international law, is clear in stating that victims of violations of 
human rights must be provided with comprehensive reparations.
1. Law Number 39 of 1999 Concerning Human Rights
This law, passed by the DPR (House of People’s Representatives) is a comprehensive statutory bill
of rights. It supplements the Constitutional Bill of Rights. Law No. 39 includes a range of rights
which are relevant to reparation, such as: right to life (art. 9); right to justice (art. 17); right to
security (art. 29); freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment (art. 32);
arbitrary arrest (art. 34). Moreover, article 7 states:
“(1) Everyone has the right to use all effective national legal means and international forums
against all violations of human rights guaranteed under Indonesian law, and under international
law concerning human rights which has been ratified by Indonesia. (2) Provisions set forth in
5
Basic Principles and Guidelines, supra note 2, art. 12.
6
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (art. 8), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (arts.
2.3, 9.5, and 14.6), International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination (art. 6),
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (art. 14),
Convention on the Rights of the Child (art. 39), UN Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearances (art. 5), UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and
Abuse of Power (art. 19), Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action
to Combat Impunity (Principles 34, 36).
7
European Convention on Human Rights (art. 5.5), American Convention on Human Rights (arts. 25, 68,
63.1), African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (art. 21.2).
8
Hague Convention Regarding the Laws and Customs of Land Warfare (art. 3), Convention (I) for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (arts. 50, 51),
Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea (arts. 51, 52), Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (arts. 130, 131),
Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (arts. 147, 148), Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (art. 91).
9
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court requires the provision of reparations to victims,
“including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation” (art. 75). It also requires the Assembly of States
Parties to establish a trust fund for the benefit of victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court (art.
79). It further mandates the Court “to protect the safety, physical and psychological well-being, dignity and
privacy of victims” and to permit the participation of victims at all “stages of the proceedings” (art. 68).
4international law concerning human rights ratified by the Republic of Indonesia, are recognized
as legally binding in Indonesia.”
Article 7 is complemented by article 71 which states that “the government shall respect, protect,
uphold, and promote human rights as laid down in this Act, other legislation, and international law
concerning human rights ratified by the Republic of Indonesia.” Together articles 7 and 71 oblige 
the government to protect and promote the human rights contained in the Law and in international
law. Such protection and promotion includes positive measures such as investigating, prosecuting,
and providing reparations when rights contained in the Law are breached. Moreover, the Law
clearly recognizes that treaties ratified by Indonesia (see section II(C) below) are binding in
domestic law.
2. Law Number 26 of 2000 Establishing Ad Hoc Human Rights Court
Article 35 of this law unequivocally provides for the right to reparation under Indonesian law for 
victims of violations of human rights: “every victim of a violation of human rights and or his/her 
beneficiaries shall receive compensation, restitution, and rehabilitation.” 
C. Treaties Ratified by Indonesia
The right of victims of gross human rights violations to comprehensive remedies is clearly stated in
the main international human rights instruments.
10
Indonesia has recently acceded to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and its provisions are now binding
on Indonesia under international law.
11
Moreover, the ICCPR’s provisions have been directly
incorporated into Indonesian domestic law.
12
Therefore, the rights contained in the ICCPR are 
justiciable and enforceable in the Indonesian legal system. ICCPR obliges Indonesia to ensure that
any person whose rights have been violated has:
• “an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons
acting in an official capacity”;
13
• a right to an effective remedy “determined by a competent judicial, administrative or 
legislative authorit[y]”;
14
and
• their remedies enforced.
15
The Human Rights Committee, which provides authoritative interpretations of the obligations
contained in the ICCPR, has stated that the right to an effective remedy encompasses a duty to
investigate breaches of the ICCPR, prosecute those responsible, and pay compensation.
16
10
See supra note 6.
11
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. The ICCPR entered into force for Indonesia on May 23, 2006.
12
Law No 12 of 2005. Art. 1(2) states that, “the copy of the original document of the ICCPR … and its
translation in Bahasa Indonesia as attached is an inseparable part of this law.” Art. 2 states: “this law enters
into force since the date of the issue.” A copy of the ICCPR is annexed to the law ensuring all of its
provisions are part of Indonesian law.
13
ICCPR, art. 2(3)(a).
14
ICCPR, art. 2(3)(b).
15
ICCPR, art. 2(3)(c).
16
See e.g., Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on El Salvador, UN. Doc. A/58/40 Vol. I
(2003) 61, para. 84(6); Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on Peru, UN. Doc. A/51/40 Vol.
I (1996) 48, paras. 347, 358.
5The ICCPR also provides that anyone who was, “the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall
have an enforceable right to compensation.”
17
Moreover, an individual whose prior criminal
conviction is overturned where there has been a miscarriage of justice is entitled to compensation.
18
The Human Rights Committee has also stated that upholding the right to life in article 6(1) or the
prohibition on torture or cruel or inhuman treatment (article 7) entails the provision of reparations
for their breach.
19
Article 28A of the Indonesian Constitution protects the right to life, while article 
28I recognizes the right to be free from torture. Given the Constitutional Court’s previous
inclination to interpret Constitutional protections in light of international law,
20
article 28A and 28I 
should be regarded as imposing an obligation to investigate and provide reparations in relation to
torture or unlawful killings.
Indonesia has also acceded to the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD).
21
In relation to racial discrimination, it provides
that Indonesia must ensure that victims can seek, from a competent national tribunal,
“adequate reparation or satisfaction for any damage suffered.”
22
The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(CAT) has also been ratified by Indonesia.
23
Its provisions have also been incorporated into
Indonesian law and are therefore binding under both international and Indonesian law.
24
In relation
to victims of torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, CAT obliges Indonesia to ensure 
that victims obtain redress. Specifically, it requires that they have “an enforceable right to fair and
adequate compensation, including the means for as full rehabilitation as possible.”
25
In relation to
this obligation, the CAT committee has stated that a State must “conduct a proper investigation into
the facts that occurred, prosecute and punish the persons responsible for those acts, and provide the 
complainants with redress, including fair and adequate compensation.”
26
Finally, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) is also binding on Indonesia.
27
In
relation to children who are the victims of human rights violations, Indonesia must “take 
all appropriate measures to promote [the] physical and psychological recovery and social
reintegration of [the] child victim.”
28
These treaties, which are binding on Indonesia both under international and Indonesian law,
establish a common understanding for addressing the rights of victims of human rights violations.
17
ICCPR, art. 9(5).
18
ICCPR, art. 14(6).
19
See e.g., Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 20, (Oct. 3, 1992) para. 15; Baboeram v
Suriname, Comm. No 146/1983, para. 13.2.
20
See infra note 31 and associated text.
21
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660
U.N.T.S. 1995. Indonesia acceded on July 25, 1999.
22
CERD, art. 6.
23
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10,
1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. It entered into force for Indonesia on Nov. 27, 1997.
24
Law No 5 of 1998. It contains the same provisions as Law No 12 of 2005 in relation to the ICCPR, supra
note 12.
25
Id., art. 14(1).
26
See e.g., Hajrizi Dzemajl et al. v. Serbia and Montenegro (161/2000), CAT, A/58/44 (Nov. 21, 2002) 85
(CAT/C/29/D/161/2000) at para. 11.
27
Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, ratified by Indonesia on Oct. 5,
1990
28
Id, art. 39.
6It should be noted that some of these treaty law obligations apply to violations of human rights
before Indonesia acceded to the treaties such as the ICCPR in 2006 or CAT in 1997. Those treaties
clearly state that a victim has a procedural right to have the incident investigated and reparations
paid. The fact that the incident has not been investigated is in itself a violation of the treaty and
ensures that a right is being violated in an ongoing manner. A breach has therefore occurred
subsequent to the ratification of CAT and ICCPR.
29
Moreover, in relation to enforced
disappearances, it is well recognized that there is an ongoing crime until proof of the victim’s death
has been established.
30
Therefore, in relation to enforced disappearances where no proof of death
has been established the violation of the ICCPR or CAT is ongoing and has occurred subsequent to
ratification. Finally, the Constitutional Court of Indonesia has correctly recognized that the 
provisions of treaties such as the ICCPR or the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, even when
not ratified by Indonesia, are relevant in interpreting the Indonesian Constitution.
31
In relation to
such violations, the treaty norms therefore function as strong presumptive guidelines in the
application of international law to domestic law.
D. Other Relevant International Law Guidelines and Documents
In 2005, the UN General Assembly adopted the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a
Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law (Basic Principles and Guidelines).
32
The 
Basic Principles and Guidelines are the culmination of over a decade of work on the subject by the 
Commission on Human Rights.
33
In that time, the Commission has formed a coherent framework
regarding the provision of reparations.
The Basic Principles and Guidelines do not entail new international or domestic legal concepts, as
the Preamble to the instrument emphasizes. They identify mechanisms, modalities, procedures, and
methods for the implementation of existing legal obligations under international human rights law
29
See, e.g., Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Maria da Penha v. Brazil, Case 12.051, Report
No. 54/01, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111 Doc. 20 rev. at 704 (2000), para. 27 ( “Despite the fact that the original
assault occurred [before entry into force of treaty] the State allegedly tolerated a situation of impunity and
defenselessness, the effects of which were felt even after the date on which [the State] acceded”).
30
See e.g., Draft International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance;
Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, IACtHR July 29, 1988, Ser. C No.4 (1988) para. 155 (“forced
disappearance of human beings is a multiple and continuous violation of many rights under the Convention
that State Parties are obligated to respect and guarantee”); Miguel Rodriguez case, Chilean Supreme Court
case striking down amnesty law (Nov. 17, 2004); Villegas Namuche case, Peruvian Constitutional Court,
(file 2488-2002-HC/TC, March 18, 2004); Eduardo Bleier v. Uruguay, Communication no. R. 7/30, May 23,
1978. See also Petra Dijkstra et al., Enforced Disappearances As Continuing Violations (May 7, 2002),
http://www1.jur.uva.nl/ailc/Enforced%20disappearances%20as%20continuing%20violations.pdf
31
Constitutional Court Decision, Case No. 011-017/PUU-I/2003, Feb. 24, 2004, available at:
http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id./.
32
Basic Principles and Guidelines, supra note 2.
33
Final Report submitted by Mr. Theo van Boven, Special Rapporteur: Study Concerning The Right To
Restitution, Compensation And Rehabilitation For Victims Of Gross Violations Of Human Rights And
Fundamental Freedoms, UN. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8); Question of the impunity of perpetrators of human
rights violations (civil and political). Final report prepared by Mr. Joinet pursuant to Sub-Commission
decision 1996/119 (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20); Final Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. M. Cherif
Bassiouni, submitted in Accordance with Commission Resolution 1999/33: The Right To Restitution,
Compensation And Rehabilitation For Victims Of Gross Violations Of Human Rights And Fundamental
Freedoms, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/62; Report of the Independent Expert to Update the Set of Principles to
Combat Impunity, Diane Orentlicher, Addendum: Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and
Promotion of Human Rights Through Action to Combat Impunity U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1; C.H.R.
Res. 2005/35, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/ L.10/Add.11 (19 Apr. 2005).
7and international humanitarian law. Their central tenets such as restitution, compensation,
rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees of non-repetition appear in a number of previous
international, regional, and municipal instruments and jurisprudence.
34
Several regional conventions also provide a right to a remedy for victims of violations of 
international human rights.
35
The Inter-American Commission and Court of Human Rights,
together with the European Court of Human Rights, have extensive jurisprudence regarding the
right to reparations and the scope and appropriate form of such remedies.
36
Both of these courts
have frequently ordered states to provide reparations to victims.
In addition, several truth commissions, similar bodies or legislation have contained reparations
schemes, such as South Africa,
37
Haiti,
38
El Salvador,
39
Ghana,
40
Malawi,
41
Guatemala,
42
Panama,
43
Peru,
44
South Korea,
45
Argentina,
46
Brazil,
47
Chile,
48
Sierra Leone,
49
and Timor Leste.
50,51
34
See, e.g., Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, G.A. Res.
40/34, Annex, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 53) at 214, U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (Nov. 29, 1985), which includes
far-reaching rights of restitution and compensation for victims. Donnelly and Others v United Kingdom, 4
ECHR Dec & Rep 4 (1975); Human Rights Committee, General Comment 21: Concerning Humane
Treatment Of Persons Deprived Of Liberty (Art. 10) (Oct. 4, 1992), para. 7.
35
See, e.g., African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (art. 7); American Convention on Human Rights,
(art. 25), European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (art. 13);
and the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture (art. 9)
36
See, e.g., Velazquez Rodríguez, Ser. C, No. 7 (July 20, 1989), para. 25. Godinez Cruz, Ser. C, No. 8, (July
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Some commentators have argued that the right to provide reparations is a norm of international
customary law.
52
Certainly, as the Permanent Court of International Justice has stated, “it is a 
principle of international law, and even a general conception of law, that any breach of an
engagement involves an obligation to make reparation.”
53
E. Nature of Victims’ Right to Remedy and Forms of Reparation
The Basic Principles and Guidelines enshrine victims’ right to the following remedies, “(a) equal
and effective access to justice; (b) adequate, effective and prompt reparation for harm suffered; and
(c) access to relevant information concerning violations and reparation mechanisms.”
54
The Basic Principles and Guidelines provide a comprehensive five-part definition of what
constitutes “adequate, effective, and prompt reparation”:
1. Restitution: The aim of restitution is to “restore the victim to the original situation” before
the violation. It includes “restoration of liberty, enjoyment of human rights, identity, family
life and citizenship, return to one’s place of residence, restoration of employment and
return of property.”
55
This report focuses mainly on the restitutive aspects of reparation. In this respect, the Basic 
Principles and Guidelines clearly state that restitution involves ensuring that victims can
exercise all of their human rights.
2. Compensation: Comprehensive compensation should be “provided for any economically
assessable damage” and should be “proportional to the gravity of the violation.”
56
3. Rehabilitation: The use of the term rehabilitation in the Basic Guidelines and Principles
should not be confused with its use in Indonesia where it refers to political restitution. The
Basic Guidelines and Principles define it in its therapeutic sense as including “medical and
psychological care as well as legal and social services.”
57
4. Satisfaction: Satisfaction includes a broad range of measures including:
“(a) Effective measures aimed at the cessation of continuing violations”;
“(b) Verification of the facts and full and public disclosure of the truth”;
“(c) The search for the whereabouts of the disappeared, for the identities of the 
children abducted, and for the bodies of those killed, and assistance in the
recovery, identification, and reburial of the bodies”;
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9“(d) An official declaration … restoring the dignity, the reputation and the rights of 
the victim and of persons closely connected with the victim”;
(e) Public apology;
“(f) Judicial and administrative sanctions against persons liable for the violations”;
“(g) Commemorations and tributes to the victims”;
“(h) Inclusion of an accurate account of the violations that occurred … in
educational material at all levels.”
58
5. Guarantees of non-repetition: The Basic Principles and Guidelines list a number 
of measures which should be implemented by member states to prevent future 
violations. They include effective civilian control of the military; independence of
the judiciary and reforming laws which contribute to gross violations of human
rights.
59
F. When Reparations should be Provided
Reparations, as detailed above, should be provided by the State when gross violations can
be attributed to it.
60
“States should endeavor to establish national programs for reparation
and other assistance to victims in the event that the party liable for the harm suffered is
unable or unwilling to meet their obligations.”
61
Moreover, States shall enforce domestic 
and foreign judgments against individuals or entities liable for the harm suffered.
62
G. Summary
Under international law, Indonesia is required to provide effective remedies to the 1965
victims who suffered gross violations of human rights. This report focuses on one type of
remedy it should provide to those victims, namely reparations. However, it also elaborates
on the broader transitional justice mechanisms Indonesia should adopt.
III. THE CONTEXT OF GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS COMMITTED IN
INDONESIA
A. The Events of September 30, 1965
The government of the Republic of Indonesia’s founder, Sukarno, came to an end as the result of a
sequence of events, the exact account of which is still uncertain. On September 30, 1965, a group
of military officers led by Lieutenant Colonel Untung kidnapped and executed six Indonesian
generals and two middle ranking officers. Many versions of the events abound. According to the 
official version, the kidnap and murder of the high-ranking officers was part of an attempted coup
by Indonesia’s Communist Party (PKI). Initially referred to as “the September 30 Movement”
(G.30-S), Soeharto’s New Order came to popularize the term, “the September 30 Communist Party
Movement (G.30-S/PKI), linking the communists to the coup as part of its campaign to destroy the
PKI and claim political legitimacy.
58
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The repression of the presumed rebels was led by Major General Soeharto, whose actions resulted
in the exponential growth of his personal political power rapidly overshadowing that of President
Sukarno. After the repression of the so-called G.30-S, Soeharto effectively assumed sweeping
powers and personally decreed the PKI to be unlawful. He claimed that President Sukarno had
authorized him to act as he saw fit. The events of September 30, 1965 and their aftermath have
been analyzed as a coup and counter-coup in which elements of the military “...crushed Untung’s
action and established dominance of anticommunist military officers under Soeharto’s
leadership.”
63
B. Gross Violations of Human Rights: Massacres and Mass Detentions
After the events of September 30, 1965, Soeharto initiated significant violence throughout much of
the archipelago that lasted until March of 1966. The targets of the killings and detentions were
those accused of being PKI members, or of having some indirect involvement through filial ties or 
membership in associated organizations. The massacres took place largely due to the absolute
power and authority vested in Soeharto to ‘take any steps necessary’ to eliminate the PKI. Soeharto
ordered all newspapers to shut down October 2–10, 1965, with the exception of two owned by the 
Army. Moreover, Law No. 11/1966 on Press Regulations outlawed the publication of communist
or Marxist-Leninist materials. Thus, the dissemination of any other version of the September 30,
1965 events and their aftermath was seriously obstructed. Many of those killed, arrested and
detained, had little or nothing to do with the PKI. In many areas, particularly in Central and East
Java and Bali, members of the Indonesian armed forces under Soeharto’s overall command
perpetrated these episodes of violence. Moreover, these armed forces mobilized civilian militias
and other civilian groups such as youth, student, or Muslim-based organizations.
64
Around the country, massacres and detentions followed the arrival of the Red Beret Paratroopers.
65
The Red Beret Paratroopers Commander, stated, “We decided to encourage anti-communist
civilian groups to assist us in this work… We trained them for two or three days, and then sent
them to kill the Communists.”
66
Telegrams sent by the US Embassy to Washington also confirm
63
Geoffrey Robinson, The Dark Side of Paradise: Political Violence in Bali (Cornell University Press,
1995).
64
Rinto Tri Hasworo, ‘Penangkapan dan Pembunuhan di Jawa Tengah Setelah G-30-S’ in Tahun yang Tak
Pernah Berakhir: Memahami Pengalaman Korban 65, (John Roosa, Ayu Ratih, and Hilmar Farid, eds.,
2004) at 29.
65
In relation to Bali, see, Geoffrey Robinson, ‘Post-Coup Massacre in Bali,’ in, Making Indonesia: Essays on
Modern Indonesia in Honor of George McT Kahin (Daniel Lev and Ruth McVey, eds., 1996) at 129–38, as
quoted by Hasworo, supra note 64, at 28.
66
Colonel Sarwo Edhie Wibowo. Hughes, Indonesian Upheaval (Fawcett, 1967) at 132, as quoted by
Hasworo, supra note 64, at 32.
According to the testimony of ex-political prisoner Suparno, on November 4, 1965, the situation
in Juana Sub-district, Central Java remained calm until the arrival of the elite Red Beret
paratroopers. (The Red Beret Paratroopers were the precursors to Indonesia’s notorious Army
Special Forces, Kopassus). Upon their arrival, the paratroopers set up two youth organizations
that were mobilized to arrest and detain those identified as members of the PKI. (The two youth
organizations were The Association of Indonesian Youth and Pupils for Action (KAPPI)
and the Association of Indonesian Students for Action (KAMI)). (Source: Hasworo, supra
note 64, at 29).
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the military’s provocation and mobilization of civilian groups to perpetrate acts of violence against
so-called communists.
67
The authorities committed murder and torture and detained those labeled as communists. The
majority of deaths and detentions occurred between September 1965 and March 1966. The number
of people killed and disappeared during this period is heavily contested. Official figures vary from 
78,000
68
to the ‘boasts’ of General Sarwo Edhie, for example, who famously claimed that up to 3
million had been killed.
69
Many victims’ organizations and NGOs, both in Indonesia and abroad,
quote figures as high as 1 million deaths.
70
More ‘conservative’ estimates put the figure in the 
hundreds of thousands.
71
The divergence in estimates and their highly contested nature is in part an
indication of the polarization of interests between the State and victims. It also demonstrates the
lack of an official and comprehensive analysis of the 1965 events. Such an analysis is needed for
the State to meaningfully acknowledge its historical responsibilities and duties and to provide
Indonesia with a clearer understanding of what happened.
As the massacres slowed down, arbitrary arrests and detention without trial increased. The
estimates of those “communist sympathizers” arrested and detained without charge or trial are 
uncertain, but could be as high as 1.7 million.
72
According to Amnesty International, “… more than
one million were detained and hundreds of thousands were held without charge or trial for up to 14
years.”
73
The arbitrary arrests and detentions where accompanied by torture, rape, and
disappearances. Most of those who survived arrest were held without being formally charged, and
were invariably moved around from one place of detention to another. They were either finally
released or detained in makeshift detention camps for many years without trial.
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Many individuals were arrested upon presenting themselves voluntarily to local police stations,
confident in their innocence. Others chose not to take the risk and went into hiding. In such cases,
the military sometimes resorted to kidnapping family members in order to secure the individual.
There were no legal rights afforded to those accused of being directly or indirectly involved in the
PKI and/or the events of September 30, 1965. Only 767 people were actually convicted of a
crime.
74
From 1968 to 1969, thousands of political detainees were transferred to Buru Island in the
Moluccas for ‘re-education,’ ‘political rehabilitation’ and forced labor (see front cover). There,
many died of malnutrition, malaria and other diseases. Eventually their families were also shipped
off to the island. Many thousands of others continued to be held in different detention centers, such
as the Plantungan ‘rehabilitation’ center for women in Central Java.
75
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‘B’ Detainees to Society (Dec. 1, 1975).
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Yahya, a card-carrying Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) activist was arrested for being a
member of the PKI. A barber from Semarang in Central Java, Yahya was taken to a prison in
Ambarawa and detained for a year before he was called up for interrogation. Yahya was
relatively lucky for he was finally able to prove his membership of the PNI and was released.
Nevertheless, he was still required to report to the village head in order to travel and his identity
card was marked with the ex-political detainee stamp (ET) (see image on front cover) (Source:
Hasworo, supra note 64, at 42. By the time Yahya was released, his wife and baby had died. Yahya
suspects his wife committed suicide. )
Lasmini was a mother of five children from Purwodadi, Central Java whose husband, Kusdi,
was being sought by the military. In late 1965, soldiers came to their home looking for Kusdi.
Angry that Lasmini could not tell them the whereabouts of her husband, the soldiers destroyed
the house and took her to Gundi police station where she was detained. “I was held for a week.
Then my husband came to take my place. He came in and I left, just like that …” Some time
later, Kusdi was moved to Purwodadi Detention Center where he disappeared. Lasmini still has
no knowledge of the fate or whereabouts of her husband. (Source: Hasworo, supra note 64, at 45-7)
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C. Soeharto’s Rise to Power and the Institutionalization of Persecution
Even prior to his inauguration as President of the Republic of Indonesia on March 27, 1968,
Soeharto’s control of power enabled him to pass a number of crucial decrees. These measures both
legitimized his rise to power and facilitated persecution of the PKI and those accused of being
sympathizers.
At the time of the events of September 30, 1965, Soeharto was Commander of the Army Strategic
Reserve Command (Kostrad). The position effectively put him in direct command of all the 
Army’s troops and in control of communications. By October 2, 1965, President Sukarno was
pressured into handing the responsibility for restoring security and order to Soeharto.
76
On October
10, Soeharto institutionalized his authority by establishing the Operational Command for
Restoration of Security and Order (Kopkamtib) and appointed himself as Commander in Chief.
77
In
his position as Commander in Chief, Soeharto proceeded to issue edicts calling for the “cleansing” 
of all PKI members, their families, and their associates.
78
It was accompanied by a large number of
dismissals from the police force and other agencies. The Instruction also allowed for monitoring
and ‘political rehabilitation’ of those who were related to political detainees or suspected of being
sympathizers. Soeharto also ordered the deployment of the Red Beret Paratroopers to oversee the
persecution. Under Soeharto, the Kopkamtib, “…quickly expanded beyond its original purpose of
tracking down PKI supporters. The Kopkamtib became the government’s main instrument of 
political control.”
79
On March 11, 1966, President Sukarno issued an Instruction that vested in Soeharto the power to,
“take all steps thought necessary to guarantee security, law and order and stability…and maintain
the integrity of the Indonesian nation-state…”
80
The next day, Soeharto exercised this power to
issue Presidential Decree 1/3/1966 outlawing the PKI.
81
On July 5, 1966, in response to Soeharto’s
wishes, the Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly (MPRS) issued MPRS Resolution No.
XXV/1966 outlawing the PKI and Marxist-Leninist ideology, thus providing some legal cover for
the persecutions. On March 21, 1967, MPRS Resolution No. XXXIII/1967 was passed removing
Sukarno from the Presidency and replacing him with Soeharto as caretaker. On March 27, 1968,
MPRS Resolution No. XLIV/1968 confirmed Soeharto as President of the Republic of Indonesia.
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D. Loss of Jobs and Land, Forced Labor and Stigmatization
During the persecution, schools, businesses, and plantations allegedly controlled by PKI
organizations or sympathizers were shut down and the buildings seized by the military. Much of 
this property now represents part of the Indonesia army’s (TNI) controversial business portfolio.
Numerous detainees were then used as forced labor to work on land which had been stolen from 
them (see front cover).
82
Some were rewarded with nominal wages, others received nothing at all.
The detainees were often used for infrastructure projects such as the building of roads, bridges,
dams, and canals.
In addition to the massacres, torture, forced labor, arbitrary arrests, and detentions, the 1965
victims lost their jobs, their homes, their land, their possessions, and their businesses. For example,
on November 8, 1965, Narhomi’s husband, a teacher, was summonsed to Juwana police station in
Central Java and detained for belonging to the Republic of Indonesia Teacher’s Association. Upon
his detention, Narhomi, also a teacher, was dismissed. With two small children and the loss of
income they had suffered, she struggled. Eventually her young son died since she could not afford
medical treatment. Narhomi’s husband was moved to a different detention center in March 1966
and his fate and whereabouts remain unknown. Narhomi could not rely on family support, as most
of her family had suffered the same fate as her husband.
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For the family members of many political detainees their stigmatization was also dramatic. For
example, Menik, from Ambarawa, Central Java, describes how upon her husband’s arrest other
villagers treated her with contempt and her family was alienated from day to day activities. The
stigmatization remained after her husband’s release in 1971. It even continued on to the next
generation with their son being dismissed from the police academy after they learnt of his father’s
detention.
84
The labeling and stigmatization of the 1965 victims was perpetuated in popular culture through
mediums such as shadow puppet plays and a film, “Treachery of the G.30-S/PKI.” This film was
shown annually on television and incorporated into the school curriculum. There are also
ceremonies and monuments, such as the “Lubang Buaya” monument in Jakarta, which serve to
‘remind’ the nation of the alleged barbarity of the communists. These practices demonized the
1965 victims and maintained a veil of silence over their persecution.
82
See Razif, “Romusha dan Pembangunan: Sumbangan Tahan Politik untuk Rezim Soeharto,” in Tahun yang
Tak Pernah Berakhir: Memahami Pengalaman Korban 65 (John Roosa, Ayu Ratih and Hilmar Farid, eds.,
2004) at 141-2.
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Pernah Berakhir: Memahami Pengalaman Korban 65, (John Roosa, Ayu Ratih and Hilmar Farid, eds., 2004)
at 66–67 and 70–72.
84
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Ngatim from South Lampung in Southern Sumatra describes how upon his arrest in November
1967 he spent one and a half years in a camp next to the Bulung River digging for sand. He and
his fellow detainees were paid nothing, and sometimes they were not even fed. Ngatim recalls
that on some occasions they would not receive anything from the government for three months,
relying on the goodwill of local people. (Source: Razif, supra note 82, at 141).
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E. Classification of Political Prisoners, Detainees, and Suspects
Soeharto introduced a classification system for the 1965 victims. They were classified into one of
the following categories before being sent off to various detention camps:
Category A: Those who were alleged to have been directly involved in the events of September
30, 1965.
Category B: PKI members and members of organizations associated with the PKI.
Category C: Those alleged to have been indirectly involved in the events of September 30,
1965, including ordinary members of outlawed organizations, those sympathetic to
the PKI, those with friends and relatives belonging to the PKI or having a
‘relationship’ with the PKI.
85
Category C, in particular, was so broad that many people were detained with no real affiliation to
the PKI. For example, Nani Nurani was classified as category C, and imprisoned for seven years
without trial in December 1968 because she had been invited to perform a traditional dance at an
alleged PKI event.
86
Even children were detained because their parents had been arrested, detained,
or killed on suspicion of being PKI. Efforts to systematize the classification system and set
parameters for its application were attempts by the regime to create a sense of order to its policies
of repression in order to gain some legitimacy. Inevitably, however, this classification system was
applied arbitrarily and in violation of the most basic legal and human rights norms.
Documents pertaining to the classification system and its implementation, specifically those 
relating to categories A and B are difficult to obtain.
87
Much more documentary evidence exists in
relation to the category C classification system. On June 25, 1975, Soeharto issued Presidential
Decree No. 28/1975 on the treatment of those classified as category C.
88
Article 1 (b-e) of the 
Decree gives a detailed breakdown of subcategories:
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(Intermassa, 1989) Appendix 9, at 190–200; See also ICTJ communication with Taufik Basari from the
Jakarta Legal Aid Foundation (LBH Jakarta).
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Nani Nurani issued proceedings against Indonesian officials in the State Administrative Court (PTUN) in
Jakarta. She claimed that in refusing to issue her with an identity card for life, she was discriminated against
in a way which breached article 25(1) of Law No. 39/1999 (ensuring citizenship rights shall be upheld
without discrimination) and article 28I(2) of the Constitution. The Court upheld her claim and ordered the
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The Treatment of Those Involved in G.30-S Category C, (Keppres No. 28/1975, June 25, 1975).
On November 23, 1965, ten-year-old Wajikan from Purworejo, Central Java was arrested and
taken to the district level military command post. He was accused of “digging a hole to bury the
generals [killed on September 30, 1965]” In reality, he was apparently in the process of digging
a new well. Wajikan was held for over a year before his case was investigated. He was
classified as category B and eventually sent off to Buru Island where he was held for over ten
years. (Source: Hasworo, supra note 64, at 43–44).
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Category C: Those indirectly involved or suspected of being indirectly involved in the events of
the September 30, 1965;
Category C-1: Those involved in the Madiun Affair
89
and who in the aftermath of the events of 
the September 30, 1965 aided the PKI and who have not explicitly condemned the 
PKI;
Category C-2: Members of outlawed organizations with the same principles as the PKI;
Category C-3 Those sympathetic to the PKI but whose physical involvement in the events of the
September 30, 1965 is unclear.
Given the failure of subsequent laws or decrees to revoke Presidential Decree No. 28/1975, it
remains in force.
90
It represents one of a number of laws and regulations that continue to
specifically discriminate against the 1965 victims.
F. Purges, Ideological Screening, Vetting and Disenfranchisement
Shortly after Presidential Decree No. 28/1975, the Civil Service Administration Body issued
guidelines for its implementation.
91
These guidelines contain detailed instructions on the treatment
of civil servants, government employees, and staff of state-owned companies classified as category
C. Such treatment included political rehabilitation, declaration of oaths of loyalty and allegiance to
the Republic of Indonesia and the state ideology (Pancasila). Moreover, the guidelines stated that
category C-2 and C-3 civil servants that have been honorably discharged retain their right to
pensions, as do C-2 and C-3 civil servants who were dismissed prior to the Presidential Decree.
This has not however proven to be the case. In December 2000, 57 former employees of the state
owned oil company, Pertamina, called on the government to reinstate their pension rights. All 57
were dismissed by Pertamina in 1974, accused of being active members of an outlawed
organization, the Oil Workers Union. In fact, the company had automatically docked Union
membership dues from their wages.
92
The government has so far not responded to their requests.
Former Caltex employees in Riau were denied pensions in similar circumstances.
In the 1970s, a range of new regulations and procedures were issued so that anyone aspiring to
work in the civil service was required to provide a certificate of non-involvement in the events of
the September 30, 1965.
93
These regulations have not specifically been repealed and therefore
remain in effect. Details as to the circumstances under which the certificate of non-involvement is
required and to whom it applies, is specified in a Kopkamtib Instruction.
94
Kopkamtib Chief of
Staff also established an ideological screening task force.
95
Moreover, other guidelines ensured that
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No. 13/SE/1975, Oct. 22, 1975).
92
Pertamina Tuntut Gelar Perkara (Bernas Dec. 7, 2000).
93
Pangkopkamtib Instructions No. KEP-020/KOPKAM/4/1970 and No. KEP-27/KOPKAM/XI/1973 in
respect of: The Procedure for Issuing a Certificate of Non-Involvement in the G.30-S/PKI; BAKN Circular
Letter 02/SE/1974; BAKN Circular Letter No. 02/SE/1975.
94
Kopkamtib Instruction No. KEP-06/KOPKAM/XI/1975 in respect of: Improvements to the Procedure for
Issuing a Certificate of Non-Involvement in the G.30-S/PKI.
95
Kopkamtib Instruction No. KEP 07/KOPKAM/XII/1975 in respect of: The Establishment of the
Ideological Screening Task Force (Dec. 17, 1975).
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anyone categorized as A, B, or C could not join the military
96
and, if they remained in the civil
service, could not earn promotion.
97
The ideological screening of civil servants and background
checks of candidate’s family members continued into the 1990s.
98
In addition, the 1965 victims were prevented from voting or standing for any legislative positions,
including local, regional and national elections.
99
In 1996, the then Director General for Social and
Political Affairs, Soetoyo, stated that in the 1971 General Elections, around 1.7 million “ex-
communists” had been prohibited from voting. Laws No. 4/1975 and 1/1985 allowed some 1965
victims to vote but only with government approval.
100
The process for obtaining government
approval was formalized in Instruction No. 32/1981, which established a government body to allow
ex-political detainees to vote based on satisfaction of the following criteria:
1. Demonstrated loyalty towards the nation and government;
2. Lack of dissemination of communist teachings;
3. Lack of participation in activities that threaten security and stability;
4. Observance of government regulations concerning security, stability, and law and order;
5. Observance of all laws and regulations.
101
According to Soetoyo, the number of those prohibited from voting had fallen to 45,000 in the 1982
elections; 41,000 in the 1987 elections; 36,000 in the 1992 elections and 20,700 in the 1997
elections.
102
In February 1999, Legislation No. 3/1999 in respect of General Elections was passed
which returned the right to vote to ex political detainees. However, until the recent Constitutional
Court decision, ex political detainees and their relatives were prohibited from standing as
candidates (see section V).
G. Release of Political Prisoners and Detainees—Surveillance, ‘Political Rehabilitation’
and Continued Persecution
In the early 1970s, with the release of thousands of political detainees, Soeharto required new
practices to maintain his strategy of demonizing the PKI in order to legitimize repressive practices
at all administrative levels. All these policies were based upon Instruction No. 32/1981,
103
which
96
PP No. 6/1976
97
BAKN Circular Letter No. 01/SE/1976 with reference to Non-Involvement Certificate Requirement for the
Promotion of Civil Servants.
98
See, Kopkamtib Implementation Instruction No. JUKLAK-15/KOPKAM/V/1982 (May 27, 1982);
Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security, Ideological Screening of Civil Servants, Civil Service
Candidates and Others (Sept. 8, 1988); Presidential Decree No. 16/1990 that provided for the notorious
Badan Penelitian Khusus or Litsus to investigate and monitor civil service candidates parliamentarians and
solicitors.
99
See, e.g., Law No. 15/1969 on the Election of Members of the People’s Constitutional Assembly Body,
(Badan Permusyawaratan Perwakilan Rakyat).
100
“The Controversy of an Activists Right to Vote”, Gatra, May 4, 1996,
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
The Rehabilitation and Surveillance of Former G.30-S/PKI Political Detainees and Prisoners (Instruction
No. 32/1981). It also incorporated The Surveillance and Restoration of Former G.30-S/PKI Prisoners and
Detainees Released into the Community and Increased Vigilance, (Kopkamtib Instruction No. JUKLAK-
04/KOPKAM/II/1974); and The Strategy for the Protection of the Pancasila Way of Life from the Latent
Threat of Communism (Kopkamtib Instruction JUKLAK-02/KOPKAM/VI/1980).
18
continues to be used now to legitimize discriminatory practices, particularly at the local level and
which states:
104
Following the release of G.30-S/PKI detainees, in order to encourage national stability
(conserve law and order)…the surveillance and restoration of former G.30-S/PKI political
prisoners…must be implemented immediately.
The guide implementing Instruction No. 32/1981 calls upon provincial governors and local
administrative officials to “carry out surveillance and reconstruction in all aspects of life, such as
attitude, behavior, and all socio-political, socio-cultural, and socio-economic activities,” in
coordination with the security forces.
105
It also states that, “each and every…activity…that may
[indicate] the return of the communist/PKI must be obstructed and annihilated.”
106
The discriminatory practices defined by the implementation guide included:
1. The “restoration” or “rehabilitation” program known as Santiaji Santikrama which also
severely curtailed mobility. It was held at least once a month at both district and village 
levels in order to ‘restore’ religious, ideological and socio-cultural norms to the ex political
detainees.
107
The Santiaji continued until 2002. One aspect of the Santiaji was that ex
political detainees were required to seek permission to move residence or travel outside of
their village, including participating in religious pilgrimages. All activities including work,
social interaction, cultural activities, and ‘mental ideology’ were monitored.
108
2. The placement of special codes on identity cards designating the holder as an ex political
detainee (ET) or member of an outlawed organization (OT). The ET code was included
on the identity card of former political prisoners and detainees, ‘without exception.’
109
(See 
example on front cover of this report). The stigmatization of 1965 victims was further
extended under Instruction No. 24/1991, which prohibits ex political detainees over the age
of 60 from being issued with an identity card for life. Normally, once an Indonesian citizen
attains the age of 60 they are issued with an identity card for life. In contrast, 1965 victims
must report periodically to authorities to have their identity card renewed.
3. Prohibition on employment in certain sectors. Former political prisoners and detainees
were banned from the following positions: “teacher/lecturer, priest, shadow-puppet master,
legal aid practitioner, journalist etc.” The implementation guide states that these positions
may be misused in order to “influence others directly or indirectly in the interests of
reviving communism.”
110
It also limits a business from employing a workforce where the
majority of the employees are ex political detainees.
111
From the late 1980s to the 1990s,
further specific judicial positions were prohibited including Judge on the Supreme, State,
104
Instruction No. 32/1991 may have been superseded by Instruction No. 10/1997. However, this instruction
retains the prohibition on issuing an ID card to former political prisoners. Human rights activists and victims’
organizations are still calling for the repeal of Instruction 32/1981. Local governments still refer to the
instruction. LBH Jakarta refers to its currency in the recent ‘Five Presidents’ case.
105
Implementation Guide No. 188.52-3609, Chapter IV, Part 1 d.
106
Id. Chapter IV, Part 1 a.
107
Id. Chapter V, Part 1 c.
108
Id. Chapter V, Part 2 a.
109
Id. Chapter V, Part 2 d. (2) b)
110
Id, Chapter V, Part 2(6)(a).
111
Id, Chapter V, Part 2(6)(b).
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State Administrative, or Religious Courts
112
and the Public Prosecutors Office.
113
The vast
majority of these discriminatory mechanisms remain current.
Soeharto persecuted the 1965 victims in an effort to obtain and maintain power. Anti-subversive
rhetoric was used in order to ensure military involvement in almost all aspects of public life. Such
military ubiquity provided both Soeharto and the military with the means to eliminate any form of
opposition, including ‘separatists,’ ‘subversives,’ and ‘deviants.’ Thus the labeling, stigmatization
and alienation of so-called communist sympathizers was an important element of Soeharto’s
strategy to wrest and maintain control of power.
IV. REFORMASI AND THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY: FAILURE TO 
REMEDY THE PERSECUTION
A. Soeharto’s Act of Clemency
By 1995 and amidst growing domestic pressure led by the National Commission of Human Rights,
Soeharto used his Presidential prerogative under Article 14(1) of the 1945 Constitution to grant
clemency to three high-profile ex political detainees. They were former Deputy Prime Minister 
Subandrio, former Minister/Air Force Commander Air Marshal Oemar Dhani and former head of
the Central Intelligence Body, Police Brigadier General Sutarto. He also announced that the ET
code on identity cards would no longer be required.
114
B. The B.J. Habibie Administration
In 1998, new President Habibie ordered the release of a number of political prisoners, including the
labor activist Muchtar Pakpahan and dissident politician Sri Bintang Pamungkas. However, many
1965 victims including those identified with organizations such as the People’s Democratic Party
remained imprisoned. In February 1999, Legislation No. 3/1999 in respect of General Elections
was passed which returned the right to vote to ex political detainees, though they were still
prevented from standing as candidates in legislative elections. As such, the Habibie administration
failed to dismantle the state persecution of the 1965 victims.
In addition, in May 1999, Legislation No. 27/1999 in respect of Changes to the Criminal Code in
Connection with Crimes Against State Security added a number of clauses that specifically
outlawed the spread and dissemination of Communist/Marxist-Leninist teachings ‘in any shape or
form’, ‘orally or in writing and via any media’ with a range of sanctions ranging from 12 to 20
years’ imprisonment.
115
112
See, respectively, Article 7 (2a) of Law No. 14/1985; Article 14 (1d) of Law No. 2/1986; Law No. 5/1986;
Article 13 (1e) of Law No 7/1989. Article 8 (d) of Law No. 17/1997 also applied the prohibitions to the Tax
Dispute Resolution Body.
113
Article 9 (d) of Law No. 5/1991.
114
See Tempo March 2–8, 2004, After 38 Years in Shackles and Asmara Nababan as quoted in Kompas
15.3.00, Aturan-Aturan Tentang “Bersih Lingkungan” Harus Dicabut.
115
Articles 107a, 107c, 107d, and 107e from UU 27/1999, Perubahan Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana
Yang Berkaitan dengan Kejahatan Terhadap Keamanan Negara, May 19, 1999.
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C. The Administration of Abdurrahman Wahid “Gus Dur”
The subsequent President, Abdurrahman Wahid, was the former leader of the influential Islamic
organization, Nahdatul Ulama (NU), many of whose members had been 1965 victims.
116
Gus Dur’s
administration gave hope to the 1965 victims, especially because he urged NU members to seek
reconciliation with them.
117
In 2000, Gus Dur issued two Presidential Decrees disbanding the
infamous National Security Agency and Special Investigations Unit.
118
The dissolution of the latter
was symbolically and practically important for former political prisoners, detainees, and their
families. It also heralded the start of a long process of removing the stigma and discrimination
directed towards 1965 victims.
The motivations officially stated for disbanding the Special Investigations Unit were an implicit
condemnation of the Soeharto era. The Presidential Decree stated:
1. “That Indonesia is a State based on the rule of law, and therefore all Indonesians are 
of equal standing before the law and government, including all activities concerning
the appointment and supervision of civil servants;”
2. “…that the task of the Special Investigations Unit was to seek information
concerning the involvement of a civil service candidate or member of staff in the
G.30-S/PKI or other outlawed organization;”
3. “That the activities of the Special Investigations Unit as referred to under point b.
are not in accordance with the principles of a State founded on the rule of law, and
thus it must be annulled.”
119
On March 14, 2000, on national television, Gus Dur apologized on behalf of the government for
the persecution of the 1965 victims and the atrocities perpetrated against them by the state.
120
He
even suggested the repeal of MPRS Resolution No. XXV/1966 (which officially outlawed the PKI
and Marxist-Leninist ideology). However, Gus Dur was unable to convince the MPR (People’s
Consultative Assembly) to repeal the Resolution, which can only be revoked by the MPR itself.
Repeal of the Resolution is thus a political rather than legal decision, which realistically requires
the support of the political elite in the DPR (House of People’s Representatives) and MPR as well
as the military.
Gus Dur’s administration also began drafting legislation for the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC) in relation to crimes under the Soeharto era. The legislation was eventually
enacted in 2004. However, the law is undermined by critical flaws that affect its usefulness as an
instrument to provide truth, reconciliation, or reparations to the 1965 victims.
121
Gus Dur enacted
116
See e.g., Agus Sunyoto et al., Banser Berjihad Menumpas PKI (Pesulukan Thoriqoh Agung, 1996) at 155;
Fathurrahman Zakaria, Geger Gerakan Sept. 30, 1965, Rakyat NTB Melawan Bahaya Merah (Sumurmas,
1997) at 110-1.
117
For an excellent discussion on Gus Dur’s attempts to encourage reconciliation between NU membership
and those identified as PKI, see Budiawan, Breaking the Immortalized Past: Anti-Communist Discourse and
Reconciliatory Politics in Post-Soeharto Indonesia, (National University of Singapore, 2003 and Elsam,
2004).
118
Keppres No. 38/2000 disbanding Bakorstanas; Keppres No. 39/2000 disbanding Litsus.
119
Keppres No. 39/2000 disbanding Litsus.
120
“Gus Dur: Sejak Dulu Sudah Minta Maaf”, Kompas, March 15, 2000. In his position as former chair of
the NU, Gus Dur also apologized for the actions of the NU and admitted that, “… in fact many of the killings
were perpetrated by NU members.”
121
For a detailed discussion of the TRC legislation see, ICTJ, Comment by the International Center for
Transitional Justice on the Bill Establishing a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Indonesia,
(June 3, 2005): http://www.ictj.org/static/Asia/Indonesia/050603.ICTJ.IndoTRCComment.eng.pdf
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some measures of clemency toward political detainees. For example, in 2000, he invoked his
constitutional prerogatives in response to parliamentary and/or Supreme Court decisions, and
issued Presidential Decrees granting pardons and restoring the reputation of some political
prisoners.
122
However, the administration’s initial interest in addressing past wrongs failed to
comprehensively address the persecution of the 1965 victims.
D. The Administration of Megawati Sukarnoputri
The administration of Megawati Sukarnoputri also failed to adequately respond to the state 
obligations to provide remedies to the 1965 victims. In 2003, the MPR held a special session to
review all its resolutions from 1960 to 2002. However, in the face of strong opposition the MPR 
refused to annul either MPRS Resolution No. XXV/1966 (outlawing Marxist-Leninist and
communist ideology) or MPRS Resolution No. XXXIII/1967 used to install Soeharto as President.
Upon completing its deliberations, the MPR issued a resolution which stated that MPRS Resolution
XXV/1966 was one of only three resolutions that were to remain unconditionally current.
123
According to this decision, Resolution XXV/1966 is not subject to legislative amendment by a new
administration. The effect of upholding Resolution XXV/1966 was to continue to forbid ex-
political detainees from standing as local, national, or presidential candidates, which was
formalized in the Law on General Elections of 2003.
124
On June 12, 2003, partly in response to these developments and partly in response to requests from
1965 victims, the Supreme Court sent a communication to the President.
125
The communication
called on the regime to institute rehabilitasi. Rehabilitasi is an Indonesian concept which is similar 
to, but narrower than, the notion of restitution under international law. In this context, it means the
restitution of the 1965 victims’ political reputation. The legal framework in relation to rehabilitasi
defines it as “… the restoration of original status, for example honor, good name, position, or other 
rights.”
126
The Supreme Court called upon the President to use the authority vested in her under
Article 14(1) of the Constitution to provide restitution for the 1965 victims. Article 14(1) of the
Constitution states that, “The President may grant clemency and restoration of rights and shall in so
doing have regard to the opinion of the Supreme Court.” In the Communication, the Supreme Court
stated that pursuant to Article 14(1) “… the power to grant rehabilitasi rests not with the Supreme 
Court but is the prerogative of the President.”
127
On July 25, 2003, the deputy head of the DPR sent a Communication to the President in response
to two 1965 victims’ organizations demands for rehabilitasi.
128
The Communication described
rehabilitasi as a “necessary element of reform that government has yet to implement” and also
122
Keppres No. 92/2000 in respect of a pardon for Father Sandyawan Sumardi and Benny Sumardi; Keppres
No. 93/2000 in respect of the restitution and pardon of R Sarwito Kartowibowo, and Keppres No. 142/2000
in respect of the restitution of Nurdin A.R.
123
Review of Material and Legal Status of Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly and People’s
Consultative Assembly Decisions from 1960–2002 (Resolution No. I/2003).
124
Law No. 12/2003, art. 60(g); Law No. 23/3003, art. 6(s).
125
Communication No. KMA/403/VI/2003 (June 12, 2003).
126
Government Regulation No. 3/2002 in respect of Compensation, Restitution, and Rehabilitation for
Victims of Gross Human Rights Violations. art. 1(6). This regulation refers specifically to the
implementation of Article 35 (3) of Law No. 26/2000 on Human Rights Tribunals, but nevertheless provides
a legal definition of rehabilitation, compensation, and restitution.
127
Communication No. KMA/403/VI/2003 (June 12, 2003), per Communication No. KMA/403/VI/2003 (
June 12, 2003), per Justice Bagir Manan.
128
Communication No KS.02/3947/DPR-RI/2003. The victims’ organizations were Forum Koordinasi Tim
Advokasi and the Lembaga Perjuangan Rehabilitasi Korban 1965’s (LPR-KROB).
22
urged the President to use her prerogative power to act in favor of the 1965 victims. On August 25,
the Indonesian Human Rights Commission sent a similar communication to the President in
response to the rehabilitasi demands of another 1965 victims’ organization.
129
In addition, the MPR
passed a resolution empowering the President to engage in rehabilitasi in relation to Sukarno and
others.
130
Unfortunately, Megawati did not use these opportunities to engage in rehabilitasi in
relation to the 1965 victims.
V. RELIANCE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT FOR REHABILITASI:
TESTING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE LAW ON GENERAL
ELECTIONS
A. The Arguments
Shortly after its establishment in 2003, the Constitutional Court received two submissions
concerning Law 12/2003 on General Elections (Electoral Law).
131
Both submissions challenged the 
constitutionality of article 60(g) forbidding 1965 victims from taking part in the elections as local
or national legislative candidates.
Both submissions
132
argued that article 60(g) was in violation of a citizen’s right to be treated
equally before the law, as provided under the Second Amendment to the 1945 Constitution,
133
and
international instruments.
134
They argued that membership of an outlawed organization was not
sufficient justification for withholding an individual’s civil and political rights, something that
could only be done by a decision in relation to a particular individual. The second submission also
argued that national reconciliation would only be possible as and when discriminatory legislation
and practices were eliminated. They referred to other discriminatory practices such as the
prohibition of an identity card for life for ex political detainees.
135
The government defended the electoral law based on a constitutional formulation limiting the
exercise of rights and in the continuing force of MPRS Resolution XXV of 1966 prohibiting
communism and Marxism-Leninism.
136
It argued that article 28(J)(2) of the Constitution allowed
for rights to be restricted according to law and that Resolution XXV of 1966 therefore ensured the
validity of the electoral law.
137
129
Communication No. 147/TUA/VIII/2003. The victims’ organization was Paguyuban Korban Orde Baru’s
(PAKORBA).
130
Resolution No. V/2003, Appendix No. 2(1).
131
Constitutional Court case No. 011-017/PUU-I/2003 (Dec. 30, 2003).
132
Group I was represented by LBH Jakarta and the Indonesian Legal Aid and Human Rights Association ,
Perhimpunan Bantuan Hukum dan HAM Indonesia (PBHI).
133
The Second Amendment enshrines a Bill of Rights in the Indonesian Constitution. The submission
specifically argued that article 60(g) breached arts. 27; 28(C)(1); (D)(1); (D)(3); (I)(2) which provide for
equality before the law and freedom from discrimination.
134
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 21; ICCPR, art. 25 (providing every citizen with the right to
be elected at elections to form a representative government).
135
Id.
136
Representing the government at the Court hearing held on Jan. 13, 2004 was Home Affairs Minister Hari
Sabarno.
137
Minister Sabarno stated that “MRPS Resolution No. XXV 1966 was the key to the drafting of Article
60(g)”: “Judicial Review UU Pemilu: Pemerintah Diskriminasikan Eks PKI”, Kompas, (Jan. 15, 2004).
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B. The Decision
On February 24, 2004, the Constitutional Court delivered a landmark decision. It accepted, with
one dissenting opinion, the arguments that article 60(g) of electoral law was discriminatory and in
violation of the 1945 Constitution.
In reaching its decision, the court held that the bill of rights prohibited all forms of discrimination.
The court concurred that article 60(g) of the Electoral Law prohibited a specific group of
Indonesian citizens from exercising their right to stand as candidates and to be elected. It held that
article 60(g) was “…a negation of citizenship rights or in other words discrimination based on
political beliefs and is thereby in violation of rights as guaranteed under Articles 27, 28 D (1) and
(3), and 28 I (2) of the 1945 Constitution.”
138
The Court acknowledged that article 28 J (2) of the Constitution provides for the limitation of
individual rights and freedoms, establishing that limitations were only permissible with the aim of
“…guaranteeing the…respect of the rights and freedoms of others and in order to fulfill just
demands in accordance with moral, religious, security and law and order considerations within a 
democratic society.” However, the Court found that in the context of an election, an individual
could only be prohibited from taking part based on considerations such as illness, age, or if the
right had been revoked by a court decision that was individual rather than collective in nature. The
Court found that, “as a State based on the rule of law, each prohibition that has a direct relationship
with rights and freedoms must be based on a court decision that has permanent legal standing.”
139
In addition, the Court found that the inclusion of article 60(g) in the electoral law pursued political
objectives and represented “political punishment” meted out to a specific group of people. The
Court rejected the argument that article 60(g) was justified by the relevant MPR Resolutions.
140
It
stated that although the MPR Resolutions were still current they did not have the legal jurisdiction
to abolish or limit the right to be elected. The Court was also of the opinion that “Article 60 (g) was
no longer relevant to the efforts towards national reconciliation that the Indonesian people have
already committed themselves to.”
141
The Court’s decision was reached with reference not only to the Constitution, but also to
international instruments such as the ICCPR, which at the time had not been ratified by the
Indonesian government.
142
The decision was therefore a positive sign that Indonesia’s judiciary
accepts the value of international law.
138
Constitutional Court Decision Case No. 011-017/PUU-I/2003, Constitutional Court Gazette, 2003–2004.
139
Id.
140
TAP MPRS No. XXV/1966 and TAP MPR No. I/2003
141
Constitutional Court Decision Case No. 011-017/PUU-I/2003, Constitutional Court Gazette, 2003–2004.
142
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 134.
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C. Wider Implications of the Decision
The Court’s decision was welcomed by victims groups and two of Indonesia’s most influential
Muslim organizations, the NU and Muhammadiyah.
143
Unfortunately, although article 60(g) was
repealed with immediate effect, the decision was not implemented before the 2004 general
elections. The first scheduled election that ex political detainees can stand for will be in 2009. By
then many of them will be experiencing advanced age and could face challenges on the basis of
poor health.
144
Nevertheless, the decision is important for its psychological boost to the 1965 victims and its
precedential value.
145
Armed with a legal decision explicitly asserting that they are equal before the 
law, 1965 victims will be encouraged to claim their rights.
146
Moreover, the ruling should also be
used to seek review of other legislation and regulations which similarly discriminate against 1965
victims.
147
For example, the electoral laws in relation to Presidential and Vice-Presidential
Elections still prohibit 1965 victims from standing as candidates.
148
The Constitutional Court
decision had the important effect of sparking calls for an end to all discrimination against 1965
victims.
149
The Chair of the Indonesian Human Rights Commission recognized the decision’s
catalytic utility by stating, “the decision…can serve as a stepping stone to re-examine all legislation
that discriminates, either socially, politically, culturally, or in terms of economic status.”
150
A major obstacle in the road to comprehensive restitution of rights for the victims of persecution is
still the MPRS Resolution No. XXV/1966 strengthened by the MPR Resolution of 2003.
151
Some 
Indonesian commentators have argued that the Constitutional Court decision requires the
revocation of all legal instruments that discriminate against the 1965 victims.
152
Certainly, the 
decision increases civil society’s leverage in calling for their revocation. Moreover, according to
Article 2 of MPR resolution of 2003, MPRS XXV/1966 must be “…implemented in a just manner
and respecting the law, democratic principles, and human rights.” Such a formulation calls for
robust constitutional scrutiny and appears to allow a process that could end in the revocation of the 
disputed Resolution.
143
See “Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi soal Eks PKI: Terobosan buat Bangsa,” Kompas (March 26, 2004)
(quoting Head of the NU, KH Hasyim Muzadi: “All Indonesian citizens, without discrimination, should have
the right to vote and to stand. This is a good thing.”); “Eks Tapol Boleh Jadi Caleg: Putusan MK Dewasakan
Proses Demokrasi”, Sinar Harapan, (Feb. 26, 2004) (citing Head of the Muhammadiyah, Syafii Maarif)
144
See, e.g., Gus Dur was prevented from standing in the 2004 presidential elections for health reasons, such
as his poor eyesight.
145
“Bitter Victory”, Tempo (March 2–8, 2004) (Referring to comments by The Foundation for the Research
of the 1965 Massacre, Yayasan Penelitian Korban Pembunuhan 1965 (YPKP))
146
Further challenges to Indonesia’s discriminatory legislation include the ‘Five Presidents Case’ and ‘The
Case of Nani Nurani’. See also the Request for General Rehabilitation for the Victims of 30.G-S 1965
submitted to President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono by LPR-KROB on Dec. 17, 2004.
147
See Tempo, supra note 145 (“the DPR and the government [should] immediately improve all laws
containing the same failing. Pending any improvement, discriminatory articles should be suspended and no
longer implemented.”)
148
Law 23/2003. Article 6 (s)
149
See, e.g., Asvi Warman Adam of the Indonesian Institute for Social Sciences (LIPI), “It is high time for us
to eliminate all forms of discrimination against former members of the PKI and their family members.”
(“Government Told to Change Policy on Ex-PKI,” Jakarta Post, (Feb. 26, 2004)).
150
Tempo supra note 145.
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MPR 1/2003. Concerning the Review of Material and Legal Status of Decisions Made by the Provisional
People’s Consultative Assembly and the People’s Consultative Assembly from 1960 to 2002
152
“Setelah Eks-PKI Boleh Dipilih sebagai Calon Anggota DPR, DPRD dan DPD,” Jawa Pos, (March 2,
2004) (quoting constitutional expert, Ismail Sunny, from the University of Indonesia).
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VI. THE PRESENT SITUATION
The Constitutional Court opened the path to judicial restitution of the rights of the 1965 victims.
However, restitution of some political rights is only a fraction of what still needs to be done to
fulfill the duties of the Indonesian State to provide reparations to the 1965 victims. After the
limited progress achieved in this area in the years since the demise of Soeharto, President Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono has a unique opportunity to comprehensively address the needs of the 1965
victims. He must start by repealing discriminatory low-level ministerial and district regulations and
pervasive discriminatory practices. Such regulations and practices are incompatible with a society
based on the rule of law and democracy.
A. Persistence of Discriminatory Practices
Legislation
The exact number of laws and regulations that discriminate against the 1965 victims is difficult to
identify. The list reviewed in this report cannot be considered exhaustive. However, the main
discriminatory laws and regulations can be identified, principally MPRS Resolution XXV of 1966
from which many others are derived.
The practice of ignoring the principle of legislative hierarchy has made it possible for subordinate
norms to remain in force depending on the discretion of low-level officials. This has been
compounded by a lack of legal rationalization which would harmonize all laws so that they are 
consistent with the Constitutional Court decision or other recent laws which have removed
discrimination against 1965 victims in some areas.
153
Indonesian laws, decrees, or regulations
remain in force unless specifically overturned by a subsequent instrument.
154
For example,
Government Regulation, PP No. 6/1976 that bans the 1965 victims from civilian and military
service is still effective.
155
Other laws regulating Veterans’ pension entitlements, and appointments
to the Tax and Religious Courts also still contain articles which discriminate against the 1965
victims.
156
The ‘Five Presidents’ class action case calling for rehabilitasi of the 1965 victims
identifies the damaging effects of several decrees that continue to affect the victims’ enjoyment of
equal rights.
157
Nevertheless, MPR Decree No. 3/2000 clearly states the hierarchy of Indonesian laws.
158
At the top
of the hierarchy is the Indonesian Constitution, followed by Statutes, then Regulations, and
Presidential Regulations. Provincial Regulations and Laws are at the bottom. The Decree also
states that legal instruments of a lower hierarchy cannot contradict with those of a higher level.
159
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See, e.g., Law No.3/1999 which returned the right to vote in general elections to the 1965 victims.
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In this scenario the Latin maxim applies, lex posterior derogate lex priori (the later law prevails over the
prior one).
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Jakarta Post, supra note 149.
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“Pasca Putusan MK Soal Eks-PKI: MK Jangan Tunggu DPR”, Kompas (June 12, 2004) (quoting Benny K
Harman, Head of the Center for the Study of the Constitution and Democracy).
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Jakarta Legal Aid Foundation Class Action No. 238/SK/LBH/III/2005 (March 9, 2005). It identifies the
following Decrees: Civil Service Administration Body (BAKN) Circular Letter No. 02/SE/1975 concerning
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Given the clear non-discrimination human rights provisions contained in the Constitution and
Statutes,
160
other regulations and provincial laws which discriminate against the 1965 victims are of 
no legal effect and could not be implemented.
Instruction No. 32/1981 was one of the key instruments used to persecute the 1965 victims (see 
sections III(E)(G)). Although some argue that it was replaced in 1997,
161
other legislation
promulgated since 1997 refers to it as their legal basis. For example, Badung District Regulation
No. 5/2001 on Resident Registration cites Instruction No. 32/1981 as the legal principle in its
promulgation. In addition, the Surabaya Municipal Development Plan to 2010 makes references to
the need to “monitor/anticipate political upheaval” and the “supervision and surveillance of [1965
victims] at village and sub-district level” (as is stipulated under Instruction No. 32/1981).
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Continued Political Stigmatization
The continued interest in maintaining the ‘specter of communism’ is often demonstrated with
pronouncements warning against alleged communist activity, blamed on politicians or activists
with views differing from the military establishment, at certain critical political junctures.
For example, in the run up to the 2004 General Elections, a Lieutenant Colonel in North Sumatra
stated that:
If we find that there are still former PKI living in [our] territorial jurisdiction…then we
must know exactly where they live.…Finding complete data on former PKI is a serious job
that cannot be negotiated.…If you find that former PKI have already passed away, then we
must have complete data about the whereabouts of their graves. If they are still alive, we 
must know where they reside.
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As recently as June 2006, the Head of the State Intelligence Body (BIN) warned parliament of the 
“hidden and camouflaged activities of communists” and that, “… we must be vigilant because
these activities are on the increase.” He informed parliament that BIN had monitored meetings in
Bandung, Bogor, Blitar, and Cipanas, and that they had succeeded in breaking up a meeting of 
1965 detainees and members of Gerwani in Bandung: “we found out about it and asked the police
to break up the meeting.”
164
A meeting of this description was broken up in Bandung on May 20,
2006, not by the police but by around 100 members of two militia organizations with alleged links
to the military.
165
The military cite Resolution No. XXV/1966 and Legislation No. 27/1999 as the
legal basis for the need to take action.
166
Also in June 2006, the military warned that the House of Representatives had been infiltrated by
sympathizers of the PKI and that it was “suspicious of” and “concerned about” the alleged re-
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Mengingkat” Detikcom, (June 12, 2006)
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27
emergence of the PKI.
167
These accusations seem intended to target those members of parliament
that have or are said to have filial links with ex 1965 political detainees based on the argument that
“you can’t guarantee that a child has broken away from the ideology of his/her parents” and that “at
the very least they have a historical grudge.”
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Similar hostility and stigmatization applies often to
members of the labor movement.
169
Labeling
Overt expressions of anti-communist feelings are still in evidence, sometimes contained in banners
and posters sanctioned by local government. For example, in Central Java and around Yogyakarta,
there are still banners warning local residents to “beware the latent threat of communism,” and that
“communists are anti-religious.”
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There have also been anti-communist demonstrations by
organizations such as the Indonesian Anti-Communist Forum. The background to such
organizations is unclear and many believe that the military or military-backed interests sponsor 
them. The rhetoric that equates communism with atheism is also used to mobilize discriminatory
sentiment, particularly among religious organizations.
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Moreover, the prohibition of an identity card for life for ex political detainees over the age of 60 is
still enforced. The effect of this policy is to brand and stigmatize the 1965 victims. Despite the 
repeal of the law in relation to stamping identity cards with an ET code, the coding of 1965 victims
remains in practice in some areas. For example, ex political detainee, Payung Salenda who spent 10
years on Buru Island, states that his identity card still bears the ET code and that the local officials
refuse to issue him with a replacement.
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B. Claims to Pensions, Appropriated Land, Buildings, and Businesses
There have been a number of claims submitted to the courts, particularly in Central and Eastern
Java, by victim’s organizations and individuals seeking restitution of a different sort. Namely, the
return of land, homes, or other property seized. For example, in June 2003, the District Court of
Kendal in Central Java found that the military had acted unlawfully when it seized a plantation
belonging to local shareholders.
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In 1966, the military had ordered the seizure of these lands,
property, and assets because they claimed the shareholders had been involved in the events of
September 30, 1965. No compensation was paid. According to the Court, the seizure had been
unlawful because “… the President is the only official who has the authority to revoke the right to
assets in the national interest,” adding that in such an event, “… compensation must be 
awarded.”
174
The Court also found that none of the shareholders had been in any way involved in
the events of September 30. Therefore, it ordered the defendants, military officials, to return the 
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15, 2006)
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land and all its assets back to its rightful owners. The court did not however order any
compensation be paid to the plaintiffs for losses incurred over the last four decades. This case is an
illustration of the many clear-cut cases where the military authorities acted unlawfully, yet the
stigma of being branded a communist was sufficient to silence the community.
Other claims have sought the reinstatement of veterans’ or civil servants’ pensions and
compensation for unpaid amounts. In Central Java, for example, the Advocacy for Community
Transformation group has been assisting 1965 victims in obtaining documents from the Regional
Employment Agency to pursue claims for their pensions.
175
However, as the above case
demonstrates, these claims have often been less successful than property restitution claims. There
is, therefore, a need for the government to take the initiative and begin a national dialog on long
due compensation.
C. Further Calls for Rehabilitasi from within Indonesia
Rehabilitasi or the restitution of political reputation has been the goal of many of the 1965 victim’s
organizations. More recently, appeals have been made directly to President Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono to issue a Presidential decree calling for rehabilitasi. For example, the Organization for 
the Rehabilitation of the Victims of the New Order (LPR-KROB), wrote to President Yudhoyono
on behalf of all of the 1965 victims outlining their claim for rehabilitasi based on Article 27 of the 
1945 Constitution.
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LPR-KROB called upon the President to use his Presidential prerogative 
under Article 14(1) of the Constitution (see section IV(D)) and issue a Presidential Decree covering
the following demands:
1. Repeal and annul all legislation that discriminates against the 1965 victims. Such laws
typically contain the following language, “those who are not former members of the PKI,
including its mass organizations, or not involved directly or indirectly in the G.30-S/PKI or
other organizations.”
2. Repeal and annul the stigma of special codes on identity cards and other documents
belonging to the 1965 victims.
3. Declare that the 1965 victims are not guilty of the crimes that were imputed to them and
recognize their status as victims of human rights violations.
4. Acknowledge that there were Indonesian citizens sacrificed by the 1965 persecution.
5. Declare the “General Rehabilitation” of the 1965 victims, restoring and returning their
dignity, status, and honor as citizens of Indonesia.
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For example, in addition to the demands above, another organization called for the President to:
1. “Instruct all government and private institutions to make an inventory [of items seized
from 1965 victims] and then return and pay compensation.”
2. “Write an objective history of the events of 1965, by taking into consideration living
witnesses and literature. Then publish the results and include them in the national
education curricula.”
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“equal status before the law and government” and “to work and live in human dignity.”
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3. “Apologize to the Indonesian people, particularly the victims by acknowledging that there
was intention and neglect on the part of state officials in 1965.”
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Another organization that has written and circulated detailed analysis and demands for rehabilitasi
points to the importance of truth seeking and the dissemination of alternative histories in the 
interest of national reconciliation.
179
They also call for other reparatory measures such as the repeal
and annulment of discriminatory legislation (they cite Instruction No. 32/1981) and monetary
compensation.
The Jakarta Legal Aid Foundation initiated in 2005 a class action against former Presidents (“the
Five Presidents class action suit”).
180
In addition to the claims above, the class action contained
demands for rehabilitasi in the form of:
• A declaration that the defendants have acted unlawfully;
• An order that the defendants provide financial compensation to the plaintiffs;
• An order that President Yudhoyono set up a team for the calculation of the losses
sustained by the plaintiffs;
• An order that the defendants make a written apology;
• An order that President Yudhoyono erect monuments to the 1965 victims and include
the history of the persecution in the national curriculum;
Although the claim was rejected by the Central Jakarta Court in September 2005 stating 
lack of authority to hear it, the Jakarta Legal Aid Foundation said they would appeal
against the decision.
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D. President Yudhoyono’s Options
As detailed in Chapter 1 of this report, the international legal obligations of the Indonesian State 
towards the 1965 victims encompass a wide range of measures which include comprehensive
reparations. Given its importance to victim groups, Indonesia should implement rehabilitasi.
However, it should also adopt a transitional justice framework to include a comprehensive policy
of reparations and a holistic approach to other transitional justice mechanisms (as identified in the 
next chapter).
Since his inauguration in October 2004, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has frequently
stated his commitment to national reconciliation. The President has shown a particular interest to
“try and find a way to restitute and compensate the Buru Island political detainees.”
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As stated in
section IV(D), President Yudhoyono has the sole prerogative under article 14(1) of the Constitution
to issue a Presidential Decree calling for rehabilitasi.
183
There are no legal obstacles to such action
given that, as previously noted, the Supreme Court has recommended it.
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Human Rights Commission have also requested that the President endorse rehabilitasi.
185
By
exercising his Presidential prerogative to restitute rights, President Yudhoyono can give substantive
meaning to his policy of reconciliation. He can also begin to pursue a comprehensive strategy of 
reparations and other transitional justice mechanisms, outlined in the next chapter of this report,
which would fulfill Indonesia’s legal obligations to the 1965 victims.
However, the President must overcome two significant problems. The first is implementation.
186
In
order to deal with the problems of legal implementation and administrative policy, the President
should be prepared to issue a Presidential decree instructing all implementing authorities and
policy-makers to revoke, repeal or annul all discriminatory regulations that are in contravention of 
the Constitution or human rights laws.
187
Such a move would have the advantage of providing
explicit guidelines as well as avoiding legal challenges to lower regulations.
The second major problem the President faces is political reluctance to alter the status quo and take 
on the power of the military. The construction of a wide political consensus will need to be 
achieved over a considerable period of time in order to revoke the main piece of discriminatory
legislation: MPRS Resolution XXV/1966. The MPR only needs to convene itself once every five 
years. This means that a sizable political majority needs to be mobilized, which can only be
achieved by the continuous activity of a vocal civil society. An Indonesian State which operates
under the rule of law and institutes a comprehensive transitional justice strategy will maximize civil
society’s ability to achieve such a political consensus.
E. Truth-Seeking: Setting the Record Straight
The adequate recovery of historical memory and the public acknowledgement of the truth about the 
violations committed are vital components of what the Indonesian State owes the 1965 victims
according to international law. Moreover, such memorialization and acknowledgment is a pre-
requisite to the effective implementation of other reparation mechanisms. Reparations which are
provided without a public acknowledgment of past violations or which are accompanied by an
amnesty are likely to be ineffective in addressing victims’ grievances. As such, the adequate 
recovery of historical memory is an essential part of the demands made by the Indonesian human
rights community on behalf of the victims. President Yudhoyono has indicated that the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) established in August 2004 would be an appropriate vehicle for 
providing restitution to the 1965 victims.
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However, the President’s unequivocal commitment to
the TRC is misplaced given the fundamentally flawed nature of the TRC.
189
The ICTJ report on the 
TRC demonstrates its problems such as a narrow focus limited to case-by-case investigation
precluding an analysis of the violence’s historical context or its widespread and systematic nature.
Moreover, the proposed TRC has the power to grant amnesties for gross violations of human rights
and may only provide reparations where an amnesty is granted. Both of these provisions clearly
violate Indonesian and international law (see sections II(B), (C)). Therefore, the TRC as currently
envisaged is not the most appropriate mechanism for the fulfillment of the duties of the Indonesian
185
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State towards the 1965 victims. The TRC should genuinely investigate the events of 1965 and
allow victim participation to create a historical narrative based on objective truth.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
The heinous past and present treatment of the 1965 victims is unacceptable and must be remedied.
The ongoing human rights violations against the 1965 victims are a burden on Indonesia’s nascent
democracy that hinders its international commitments to respect and protect human rights.
Responsibility to rectify those violations rests primarily with the Indonesian State. Furthermore,
although this report has focused on the 1965 victims, there were a myriad of other human rights’
infringements perpetrated during the Soeharto era. Such abuses must also be addressed. Tackling
the 1965 violations in isolation would be ineffective and improper.
Given the ICTJ’s considerable experience observing and providing technical advice with respect to
reparations and other transitional justice mechanisms in different contexts around the world, it
hopes that the different stakeholders in Indonesia will carefully consider the following
recommendation.
1. Indonesia must adopt a holistic and comprehensive transitional justice strategy in relation
to all gross violations of human rights committed by the Soeharto administration. These
measures should not just apply to the 1965 victims but to all victims of gross violations of 
human rights. Such strategies must recover the true history of the era and should include an
integral approach to issues such as reconciliation,
190
prosecutions,
191
reparations
192
and
other transitional justice mechanisms.
193
Specifically, in relation to the 1965 victims, the ICTJ has the following recommendations:
2. Victims and civil society must be principally involved in the development, implementation,
and evaluation of any transitional justice framework used to remedy their situation. They
must participate in the decision making process to determine which policies are prioritized,
since mechanisms imposed without consultation are likely to be ineffective.
3. In providing remedies to the 1965 victims, the class of victims should not be defined
narrowly in terms of proven former political affiliation. Given that the term “1965 victims”
encompasses a wide range of victims persecuted for broadly defined political reasons, it
should be applied similarly expansively in providing reparation.
4. Based on Supreme Court, DPR, and MPR authority, the President of the Republic should
exercise his Prerogative Powers under article 14(1) of the Constitution and issue a 
Presidential Decree which officially:
• recognizes that the 1965 victims suffered gross violations of their human rights;
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• declares that those 1965 victims unfairly stigmatized were not guilty of the crimes
alleged against them;
• apologizes on behalf of the State for the deliberate infliction of gross violations by the 
State upon the 1965 victims; and
• restores the dignity, reputation, and rights of the 1965 victims.
5. The Indonesian government should remove, discontinue, or redesign monuments or 
commemorations that stigmatize the 1965 victims. It should also erect new tributes to the
1965 victims which remember and recognize the violations perpetrated against them.
6. In order to cease continuing violations and discrimination towards the 1965 victims, the
following action is necessary:
• The MPR should revoke Resolution XXV/1966 which has been used as a continuing
justification for discriminatory policy and action towards the 1965 victims.
• All laws should be reviewed to identify those which discriminate against the 1965
victims. All discriminatory laws and regulations should be explicitly revoked
including: Presidential Decree No 28/1975 regarding the classification system (see
sections III(E), (F)); Instruction 32/1981 and its implementing guide regarding
discrimination in employment, identity cards, and surveillance (see section III(G)); and
Law 23/2003 which prohibits the 1965 victims from standing as Presidential or Vice-
Presidential candidates.
• The President and the Parliament should officially declare that they will not enact any
new discriminatory regulations infringing on freedoms of expression and association.
• The Government should promote MPR Decree No. 3/2000 which states that the
Constitution and Statutes are at the apex of the legal framework and that other lower
level regulations cannot contradict them. In particular, it should promote the non-
discrimination clauses in the Constitution and Human Rights laws (see note 187).
• The President should issue a decree stating that any discriminatory regulations are not
to be implemented by local officials, stating explicitly that such regulations contravene 
the Constitution and human rights legislation (see note 187).
• The Government should promulgate policies to ensure that public officials do not
institute any further policies or practices which discriminate against the 1965 victims,
including appropriate sanctions against any public official who continues to
discriminate against the 1965 victims.
• The government should counter the legacy of cultural repression created by the
Soeharto regime by promoting a tolerant society which does not stigmatize the 1965
victims. In particular, posters, ceremonies, films, or plays stigmatizing the 1965
victims should be the object of critical analysis. Hate speech against the 1965 victims
should not be acceptable in public affairs.
7. A dialog with victims must begin which establishes the true nature of the events of 1965
and which contains a public disclosure of the true facts:
• The government must officially recognize that the historical narrative in relation to the 
events of the 1965 was politically instrumentalized in the past and that the historical
narrative must be rectified based on the objective truth of what happened rather than
political interests.
• Following consultation with victims, a TRC should be considered which can
effectively verify the truth and encourage reconciliation. The current legislation on a
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TRC is fundamentally flawed and it should be remedied in order to serve the purpose
of historical clarification.
194
• The national education curriculum should be revised to include the objective historical
narrative in relation to the 1965 victims and fostering a culture of tolerance and
understanding.
• In addition to obtaining an accurate historical narrative, any genuine mechanism for 
official truth-seeking must allow for victim participation, providing opportunities for 
victims to publicly recount their experiences and to restore their dignity through public 
hearings and commemorations.
8. Those bearing the most responsibility for committing gross violations of human rights
against the 1965 victims should be brought to justice. Sanctions should be in the form of
judicial prosecution or, if appropriate, administrative measures.
9. The government should establish a mechanism to identify all property illegally seized from
the 1965 victims. Once identified all assets, including property, land, buildings, and
plantations which remain State owned should be returned to the 1965 victims.
195
Such a 
scheme should make allowances for individuals who may not be able to prove they had
formal title to property.
10. The government should implement genuine efforts to restore employment or provide 
appropriate compensation to those 1965 victims arbitrarily dismissed from State
employment and who seek reinstatement.
196
Restitution of wages should be based on a
neutral and uniform benchmark rather than perpetuating wage differentials.
11. In addition to the above, the 1965 victims must be able to freely exercise all of their human
rights, especially in relation to identity, family life, and freedom of expression, association,
and political participation.
12. Both the State and those guilty of gross violations should be required to pay compensation
to the 1965 victims. Either a TRC or a separate mechanism should be established to
address the losses sustained by the 1965 victims, in particular loss of employment and
pensions as well as harm suffered and other damage.
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Victims must participate in the
development of a compensation scheme to ensure its legitimacy and effectiveness.
13. In addition to affirming the rights of the 1965 victims, State institutions must be reformed
in order to guarantee that the rights of the Indonesian citizens are not infringed in the future
through stigmatization and persecution.
14. Personnel in State institutions at all levels and, in particular, the security forces, should be 
trained against discriminatory practices. Any ideological indoctrination of such personnel
must be discontinued immediately and replaced by respect to the rule of law and
democratic freedoms.
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15. Measures which have already advanced rehabilitasi, such as the Constitutional Court
decision on the general elections, should be officially disseminated, taught, and actively
promoted by Indonesian authorities. Future measures of reparations and other measures
which assist victims should be actively publicized by State institutions.
16. The above measures should be available to all 1965 victims irrespective of their residence
or citizenship or refugee status. The government should undertake a comprehensive study
of the situation of refugees or persons otherwise in exile due to the events of 1965.
198
Specific measures should be implemented to encourage those in exile to return to Indonesia
if they desire.
17. The above measures should pay particular attention to the gendered nature of some
violations, by consulting with female victim groups and designing reparations programs
which recognize women’s particular victimization.
18. The international community should engage in activities which support and strengthen
victim organizations in Indonesia. Such endeavors should increase the capacity and
resources of civil society in Indonesia to enable them to advocate for reparations for the
1965 victims and in favor of democratization efforts more broadly.
The ICTJ urges all Indonesian stakeholders to respect the human rights of victims and support their 
right to reparations. The government of Indonesia must provide such reparations in the context of a
comprehensive transitional justice strategy that is fully consistent with international law.
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VIII. GLOSSARY
1965 Victims: All those people who were discriminated against or who suffered gross violations of 
human rights as a result of being categorized under Soeharto’s classification system (see section
III(E)).
BIN: State Intelligence Body
DPR: House of People’s Representatives.
ET: The code placed on identity cards of ex-political detainees, signifying Ex-Tapol.
Events of 1965: All of the actions and omissions which caused harm to the 1965 victims.
Events of September 30, 1965: The executions of the Indonesian generals on September 30, 1965
and its immediate aftermath into October 1, 1965.
Ex-political detainees: All those 1965 victims who were detained for their alleged Communist
Party involvement.
PKI: Indonesian Communist Party
G.30-S: The Soeharto acronym for the “September 30 Movement” denoting people alleged to have
been involved, even indirectly, in the alleged attempted coup of September 30, 1965.
G.30-S/PKI: The Soeharto acronym for the “September 30 Communist Party Movement” denoting
those members of the Communist Party alleged to have been directly involved in the alleged
attempted coup of September 30, 1965.
Inmendgari: Instruction.
Keppres: Presidential Decree.
Kostrad: Army Strategic Reserve Command. Soeharto was Commander during the events of
September 30, 1965.
Kopkamtib: Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order. Soeharto appointed
himself Commander in Chief (Pangkopkamtib) after the events of September 30, 1965.
LPR-KROB: Organization for the Rehabilitation of the Victims of the New Order. Leading
victim’s organization seeking justice for the 1965 victims.
MPR: People’s Consultative Assembly.
MPRS: Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly. The former MPR.
NU: Influential Islamic organization, Nahdatul Ulama. It was led by former President
Abdurrahman Wahid.
OT: The special codes placed on the identity cards of those alleged to be a member of an outlawed
organization.
Red Beret Paratroopers: Elite members of the Indonesian army established by Soeharto and which
perpetrated serious violations against the 1965 victims. They were the precursors to Indonesia’s
notorious Army Special Forces, (Kopassus).
Rehabilitasi: The Indonesian concept similar to restitution, but which merely calls for the
restoration of the reputation and honor of an individual. Recently a campaign has developed for
rehabilitasi specifically in relation to the 1965 victims.
Resolution XXV/1966: The Resolution passed by the MPRS in 1966 which banned the Communist
Party and communist ideology.
Tapol: A contraction of the Indonesian words tahanan politik, meaning political prisoner. The term
was used to refer to 1965 victims who were imprisoned without trial or charge.
TNI: Indonesian Army.
TRC: Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
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